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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an attorney discipline case. A Hearing Committee ("Committee") of the 
Professional Conduct Board has recommended to this Court that Appellant Bobby E. Pangburn 
("Appellant") be disbarred for professional misconduct and that the effective date of disbarment 
be February 1,2010. 
B. Course of Discipline Proceedings 
In a prior Idaho formal charge reciprocal disciplinary case, Appellant was suspended for 
five years, with three years withheld, commencing January 31, 2008. That suspension arose out 
of Appellant's representation of clients in Oregon. In August 2004, Respondent resigned in lieu 
of discipline in Oregon. Consistent with the Oregon rules, the resignation did not include an 
admission of any violation of the Oregon rules of professional conduct. (R., pp. 185-186.) 
Appellant's two-year suspension commenced January 31, 2008 following issuance of a 
Disciplinary Order by this Court on January 17, 2008. (Exhibit 9, pp. 9-12.) Appellant was 
eligible to request reinstatement following that suspension on February 1, 2010. (R., p. 186.) 
However, on May 20, 2010, before Appellant requested reinstatement, the Idaho State 
Bar ("ISB") filed the Complaint in this disciplinary matter. (R., p. 186.) The Complaint alleged 
that Appellant committed specified acts of professional misconduct in conjunction with the 
representation of two clients. Count One alleged that Appellant violated LR.P.C. 1.16(d) 
[Failure to refund unearned fees upon termination of representation] and 8.4(c) [Conduct 
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I I 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation]. Count Two alleged that Appellant 
violated I.R.P.C. 1.3 [Failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness], 1.7(a) [Conflict 
of interest] and 8.4( d) [Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice]. Count 
Three alleged that Appellant violated I.R.P.C. 5.5(a) [Engaging in the unauthorized practice of 
law], I.B.C.R. 516(a)(10) [Practicing law after effective date of suspension] and I.B.C.R. 
516( a)(7) [Failing to remove attorney listing from telephone directory]. (R., pp. 2-12.) 
The Committee was assigned on June 1,2010. (R., pp. 13-14.) The Committee issued a 
Scheduling Order on August 2, 2010 that required Respondent to file an answer by August 9, 
2010 and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for October 6 and 7, 2010. (R., pp. 17-19.) On 
August 9, 2010, Appellant filed his Answer. The Answer denied that Appellant violated the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct alleged in the Complaint. (R., pp. 20-24.) On August 13, 
2010, the ISB served its First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents. 
(R., pp. 25-26.) 
On October 6, 2010, the parties filed a Stipulation. The Stipulation provided that 
Appellant would serve an additional 18 months suspension, an additional 18 months of 
suspension would be withheld, and it specified terms and conditions relating to reinstatement and 
a three year probation upon terms and conditions. (R., pp. 28-92.) 
Paragraph 7 of that Stipulation provided that "if the Hearing Committee of the 
Professional Conduct Board or the Idaho Supreme Court declines to accept this StipUlation 
and/or Recommendation, each party has the right to withdraw from this Stipulation and proceed 
to hearing on the merits." (R., p. 38.) On October 27, 2010, the Committee issued its 
Recommendation consistent with the Stipulation. (R., pp. 93-95.) On October 28, 2010, the 
Clerk of the Professional Conduct Board filed the record with the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Respondent's Brief - 5 
On November 30,2010, the Court issued its Order to Remand. That order remanded the 
case to the Committee "for the reconsideration of more significant sanctions." (R., p. 184.) 
On February 18, 2011, the Committee entered a Scheduling Order scheduling an 
evidentiary hearing on April 4, 2011. (R., pp. 98-99.) The parties filed a Pre-Hearing 
Stipulation on March 30, 2011. In the Pre-Hearing Stipulation, the paIiies stipulated to the 
admission of facts, the ISB's Exhibits 1-9 and Appellant's Exhibit 10 and that the hearing would 
be limited to the issue of the recommended sanction. (R., pp. 100-114.) The hearing was 
conducted on April 4, 2011. (R., pp. 115-182 (transcript)) Following presentation of the 
evidence, the Committee took the matter under advisement. On July 27, 2011, the Committee 
entered the Hearing Committee Decision. (R., pp. 183-213.) That Decision recommended that 
Respondent be disbarred. (R., p. 212.) 
On August 11, 2011, Appellant filed his Motion to Alter or Amend and Request for 
Hearing. (R., pp. 214-248.) On August 18,2011, the ISB filed its Memorandum in Response to 
Motion to Alter or Amend and Request for Hearing. (R., pp. 249-257.) On August 23, 2011, 
Appellant filed his Reply to Plaintiff s Response to Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend. 
(R., pp. 258-263.) 
On November 9,2011, the Committee issued its Decision on Motion to Alter or Amend 
and Request for Hearing. (R., pp, 264-268.) The Committee denied the Motion to Alter or 
Amend, recommended Appellant be disbarred, but recommended that the effective date of the 
I disbarment be February 1, 2010. (R., p. 267.) On November 15, 2011, the Clerk of the 
Professional Conduct Board filed the Supplemental Certificate of Record Following Remand. 
Appellant file his Notice of Appeal on December 3, 201]. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
The Committee's Decision summarized the stipulated facts and contained additional 
findings of fact. (R., pp. 184-205.) The Committee initially specified Appellant's disciplinary 
history with the Idaho and Oregon state bars. In June 2001, Appellant was publically 
reprimanded by a Hearing Committee of the Professional Conduct Board for violations of 
I.R.P .C. 1.3, 1.4, 1.15( d) and 8.4( d). The public reprimand provided that Appellant accepted a 
$200 flat fee to accomplish an expungement sought by his client, Maldonado. Maldonado made 
numerous inquiries about the progress of the matter. At first, Appellant assured him the matter 
was in progress. Later Maldonado had difficulty in reaching Appellant at all. Ultimately, 
Maldonado determined that the expungement proceeding had never been filed. Appellant 
maintained that he did file the expungement, but the paperwork had been lost in the court system. 
Appellant agreed to refund the $200 fee for the services to Maldonado, but the check bounced. 
Maldonado eventually filed a small claims case to obtain return of the $200 and Appellant paid 
Maldonado $200 plus the small claim filing fee following mediation. (Exhibits 9, pp. 50-51, 83-
86.) 
On January 23, 2003, Bar Counsel issued Appellant a private reprimand relating to his 
representation of Harris in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Appellant did not respond to the 
notice of intent to dismiss the petition and the petition was dismissed. Despite Harris' multiple 
efforts to contact Appellant, Appellant did not advise Harris of the dismissal and Harris was 
advised about the dismissal of the petition from the court. Appellant appealed the private 
reprimand. On August 26, 2003, the Hearing Committee changed the sanction to an informal 
admonition, giving significant consideration to the mitigating circumstance that Appellant had 






instructed his staff to follow normal procedures to send the dismissal notice to Harris. (Exhibit 
9, pp. 51-52, 78-82.) 
In August 2004, Appellant resigned from the Oregon State Bar in lieu of discipline. 
Consistent with the Oregon bar rules, the resignation did not include an admission of any 
violations of the Oregon rules of professional conduct, but the Oregon bar rules prohibit 
Appellant from ever applying for reinstatement. If the Oregon bar rules change in the future to 
allow Appellant to apply for reinstatement, his application will be treated as if he had been 
disbarred and he will not be entitled to challenge the validity of the allegations in the Oregon bar 
complaints. (R., p. 185.) 
In that case, the Oregon State Bar had filed two formal charge complaints. The first 
formal charge complaint was filed in December 2002 and charged Appellant with 21 violations 
of the Oregon disciplinary rules, including, among other things, two counts of engaging in 
dishonesty and misrepresentation, three counts of failure to cooperate and failure to truthfully 
respond to disciplinary authorities, seven counts of neglect of legal matters, one count of failure 
to deposit and maintain client trust funds, four counts of failure to prepare complete and adequate 
records and failure to account for client funds, and three counts of failure to promptly deliver 
client property. Appellant admitted that he violated the Oregon bar rules regarding cooperation 
and responding to disciplinary authorities. While the first complaint was pending in Oregon, a 
second complaint was filed in June 2004 charging Appellant with 12 violations of the Oregon 
disciplinary rules. Those violations included, among other things, four counts of failure to 
cooperate and failure to respond truthfully to disciplinary authorities, one count of neglect of a 
legal matter, one count of failure to prepare complete and adequate records and failure to account 
for client funds, one count of failure to promptly deliver client property, one count of dishonesty 








or misrepresentation, one count of excessive fees, and one count of failure to deposit and 
maintain client funds in trust. (R., pp. 203-204.) 
In June 2005, the ISB filed a reciprocal proceeding against Appellant based upon the 
Oregon disciplinary proceedings. In September 2005, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the 
reciprocal disciplinary case, which was denied by a Hearing Committee in November 2005. The 
hearing on the reciprocal case was held in December 2005. Following hearing, the parties 
submitted proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations. In March 2007, 
the Hearing Committee issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. 
(Exhibit 9, pp. 13-73.) The Hearing Committee found that Appellant had committed multiple 
violations ofI.R.P.C. 1.2,1.3,1.4, 1.16(d) and 8.4(c), and one violation each ofI.R.P.C. 1.5(f) 
and 8.4(d). Those violations related to Appellant's representation of 7 clients in Oregon in a 
variety of post-conviction relief proceedings. (Exhibit 9, pp. 13-77.) 
On January 17,2008, this Court issued its Disciplinary Order in that reciprocal case. The 
Disciplinary Order suspended Appellant for 5 years, with 3 years of that suspension withheld. 
The Order specified conditions of reinstatement and a three year probation following 
reinstatement, upon specified terms and conditions. (Exhibit 9, pp. 9-12.) Appellant was not 
eligible to be reinstated until February 1, 2010. 
The last instance of Appellant's disciplinary history before this case was in October 2008. 
Bar Counsel issued a private reprimand to Appellant relating to his representation of a client, 
Jensen, in an uncontested custody modification case, in which Jensen paid Appellant a fixed fee 
for the representation. (Exhibit 9, p. 1.) Bar Counsel determined that Appellant violated 
I.R.P.C. I.2(a) and 1.4 by failing to abide by Jensen's decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation, failing to consult with Jensen as to the means by which his objectives would be 






pursued, failing to keep Jensen reasonably informed about the status of his custody modification 
matter, failing to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information from Jensen and not 
explaining the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to pelmit Jensen to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation. (Exhibit 9, pp. 1-8.) 
In March 2008, the Client Assistance Fund of the ISB paid Loretta Vermette $7,280, 
following a client assistance fund matter contested by Appellant. Count One of the Complaint 
relates to Appellant's representation of Loretta's son Robert Illingworth and that Client 
Assistance Fund claim. 
With respect to the allegations in Count Two of this case, an appeal was dismissed by 
stipulation to enable Robert Hall to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim against 
Appellant relating to Appellant's trial representation. In March 2009, Mr. Hall's counsel filed a 
StipUlation for Entry of Judgment stating that substantial investigation showed the only claim for 
post-conviction relief that had any realistic chance of being embraced by the court was the 
Appellant's failure to file a Rule 35 motion for Mr. Hall. In December 2009, the Court entered 
an amended order granting a Rule 35 relief that concluded Mr. Hall's Rule 35 proceedings. In 
May 2010, the ISB filed the Complaint in this case. 
The Committee noted Count Three had been dismissed. Bar Counsel and Appellant had 
a number of discussions relating to Count Three of the Complaint and Appellant provided Bar 
Counsel with letters from the supervisors of yellow page directory listings that proved that the 
identification of Appellant as an attorney during his suspension was the mistake of those 
companies. Appellant also demonstrated that his representation of the client identified in Count 
Three was permissible follow up to his prior representation in bankruptcy court and consequently 








the parties agreed that Count Three was dismissed in its entirety for lack of clear and convincing 
evidence supporting the alleged violations. (R., pp. 110-111.) 
The Hearing Committee found the following facts m this case. In 2005, Robert 
Illingworth ("Robert") pled guilty to felony injury to a child and was sentenced. (R., pp. 188-
189.) In March 2006, Robert's parole was denied. Thereafter, he contacted Appellant to 
represent him in attempting to obtain an early release. (R., p. 189.) In April 2006, Loretta 
Vermette ("Loretta"), Robert's mother, paid Appellant a $2,000 fixed fee to travel to Orofino to 
consult with Robert. (R., p. 189.) Appellant met with Robert in Orofino and then sent him a 
letter discussing his proposed strategy and requesting a $10,000 "retainer deposit" to be billed at 
his $200 dollar hourly rate. In June 2006, Loretta sent Appellant the $10,000 retainer fee. (R., p. 
189.) 
On July 28, 2006, Robert sent Appellant a letter terminating his representation and 
requesting a full refund. (R., p. 189.) On July 31, 2006, Loretta filed a disciplinary grievance 
and a Client Assistance Fund claim seeking reimbursement of $12,000 based on Appellant's 
alleged failure to perform the requested work on Robert's case. (R., p. 189.) 
On March 30, 2007, the Client Assistance Fund Committee ("CAF Committee") held a 
hearing. Appellant submitted a copy of his time records from May through July 2006, reflecting 
that he performed 13.6 hours of work on Robert's case, in addition to the Orofino consultation 
for which he was paid a $2,000 fixed fee. (R., p. 189-190.) On June 27, 2007, the CAF 
Committee entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. The CAF 
Committee concluded that Appellant worked 13.6 hours for a total of $2,720 and also concluded 
that because Appellant failed to return the unearned portion of the $10,000 retainer fee as 
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required under I.R.P.c. 1.16(d), he engaged in dishonest conduct as defined in I.B.C.R. 601(e) 
and recommended that Loretta be reimbursed $7,280. (R., p. 190.) 
On July 26, 2007, the Board of Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar ("Board") issued 
an Order of Remand to clarify a discrepancy regarding the amount Loretta claimed to have paid 
Appellant. The Board ordered the CAF Committee to recommend a dismissal if Appellant 
reimbursed Loretta the amount determined by the CAF Committee. (R., p. 190.) On September 
12,2007, the CAF Committee held a second hearing and issued Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. The CAF Committee concluded that Loretta 
submitted proof of $12,000 in payments to Appellant and that the $7,280 reimbursement amount 
was correct. The CAF Committee also stated it would recommend dismissal if Appellant 
refunded that amount to Loretta within 14 days. Appellant did not refund the unearned fees. (R., 
p. 190.) 
On November 30, 2007, the Board issued its Order conduding that Appellant's failure to 
refund the unearned portion of the $10,000 retainer constituted dishonest conduct and affirmed 
that Loretta's claim against the Client Assistance Fund be allowed in the amount of $7,280. (R., 
p. 191.) The Client Assistance Fund paid Loretta $7,280 on March 13,2008. Appellant has not 
reimbursed the Fund for any portion of those funds. (R., p. 191.) 
As a result of those admitted Count One factual allegations, Appellant admitted he 
violated I.R.P .C. 1.16( d) [Failure to refund unearned fees upon termination of representation] 
and I.R.P.c. 1.15(d) [Failure to keep property separate until a dispute between the lawyer and 
client is resolved]. (R., p. 110.) The parties agreed that there was not clear and convincing 
evidence that Appellant's failure to return the unearned fees upon termination of representation 
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involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation within the meaning of I.R.P.C. 8.4(c). 
(R., p. 196.) 
The Count Two facts related to Appellant's representation of Robert Hall ("Robert"). 
Robert was charged with trafficking drugs in 2001. Appellant was appointed Robert's trial 
counsel and filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the search of Robert's mother's home was 
invalid for lack of probable cause. That motion was denied. (R., p. 191.) In July 2002, a jury 
found Robert guilty of eight felony counts and a persistent violator charge. He was sentenced in 
August 2002 to fixed term sentences totaling 39 years to run consecutively and indeterminate 
terms totaling 20 years. Robert appealed, claiming the sentence was excessive and the district 
court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") 
appointed to Robert's appeal determined that appealing the denial of the motion to suppress 
would be frivolous and raised the single issue of whether the sentence was excessive. Robert's 
sentence was affirmed by this Court in June 2003. (R., pp. 191-192.) 
On February 19, 2004, Robert filed a pro se Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction 
Relief ("Petition"). The Petition did not specify any claim, but referenced an attached Affidavit 
and Memorandum of Law ("Memorandum"). In the Memorandum, Robert listed a number of 
claims and in his Affidavit raised the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon 
Appellant's failure to raise the claims outlined in his Memorandum. Robert also claimed that the 
SAPO was ineffective because she did not raise certain claims. (R., p. 192.) 
The district court appointed Appellant to represent Robert during post-conviction 
proceedings. (R., pp, 192-293.) On October 14, 2004, Appellant filed a Motion for Leave to 
Amend the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which was granted. (R., p. 193.) On November 
12,2004, Respondent filed Petitioner's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("Amended 
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Petition"). In the Amended Petition, Appellant presented Robert's claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel and an invalid search warrant. Appellant omitted Robert's claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, thereby effectively waiving that claim. The State 
moved for summary dismissal of the Amended Petition. (R., p. 193.) 
At the May 5, 2005 hearing on the Amended Petition and dismissal motion, the district 
court dismissed Robert's invalid search warrant and arrest claim, but granted a continuance on 
the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. (R., p. 193.) On October 18, 2005, the 
district court held an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim 
and on February 13, 2006, entered an order denying that claim. Appellant filed a timely notice 
of appeal. (R., p. 193.) 
During appeal, attorney Robin Fyffe represented Robert and requested a remand based 
upon Appellant's conflict of interest. The State agreed that the case should be remanded so that 
Robert could reassert the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, since that claim was 
waived because Appellant did not include it in the Amended Petition. (R., pp. 193-194.) 
On March 7, 2007, the Idaho Court of Appeals remanded the post-conviction case for 
further proceedings. That Court noted that Appellant's inclusion of an ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel claim would have required that he allege his own representation had been legally 
deficient and concluded that that conflict of interest directly resulted in the waiver of Robert's 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. (R., p. 194.) The case was remanded to the district 
court to appoint new counsel to litigate that claim. The denial of the claim for relief based upon 
the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was affirmed. (R., p. 194.) 
In October 2007, attorney Keith Roark filed Robert's Second Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief ("Second Petition"). The Second Petition listed six grounds for relief based 




upon Appellant's alleged failure to provide effective assistance as trial counsel, including 
Appellant's failure to file a Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of Robert's sentence. (R., pp. 
194-195.) 
Following the proceedings on remand, on March 9, 2009, Mr. Roark filed a Stipulation 
for Entry of Judgment stating that substantial investigation showed that the only claim for post-
conviction relief that had any realistic chance of being embraced by the court was Appellant's 
failure to file a Rule 35 motion. The State did not concede that relief would be granted, but 
agreed that the court should grant post-conviction relief by entering a judgment permitting a 
hearing on the Rule 35 motion in order to avoid further lengthy, time consuming and expensive 
proceedings and in the interest of justice. All other grounds for relief set forth in the Second 
Petition were dismissed with prejudice. The court entered a judgment consistent with the 
stipulation. (R., p. 195.) 
On July 16, 2009, Mr. Roark filed a Rule 35 motion and hearings on that motion were 
held in November 2009. The court entered the final order granting Rule 35 relief on December 
3, 2009. Under that order, the mandatory minimum sentences of the three fixed terms ran 
consecutively to comprise a minimum fixed term of 18 years, as opposed to the 39 years in the 
original sentence. All portions of the sentences imposed on the other five counts and/or any 
sentence related to the persistent violator charge ran concurrently with the mandatory minimum 
sentences. The indeterminate portions of the sentences, totaling 20 years, were unchanged. (R., 
pp.195-196.) 
Appellant admitted that he violated I.R.P.C. 1.3 [Failing to act with reasonable 
diligence]; 1.7(a) [Conflict of interest]; and 8.4(d) [Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice ] in Count Two. (R., p. 196.) 
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The Committee also made additional findings of fact, which can generally be described 
as mitigating and aggravating circumstances relating to the Committee's recommended 
discipline. The Committee initially noted that Appellant had been a social studies government 
teacher in the Meridian School District since January 2011. CR., p. 198.) 
With respect to Count One, the Committee found that Appellant believed that he was 
under attack by Loretta and Robert and that Loretta lied about or misrepresented certain facts, 
and created false evidence against him. Appellant felt he needed to defend himself from this 
attack. CR., p. 198.) Appellant admitted that he could have handled the claim for reimbursement 
of attorney fees to Loretta differently or better. CR., p. 198.) He offered to sign a promissory 
note in favor of the ISB after he filed for bankruptcy protection, but he has not signed a 
promissory note in favor of the ISB for purposes of repaying the Client Assistance Fund and 
although he asserted he intends to pay the ISB back for monies paid by the Fund, to date, he has 
taken no steps to pay back the ISB. CR., p. 198.) The Committee also found that at the time 
Appellant was appointed to represent Robert, he had resigned from the Oregon State Bar in the 
face of two formal complaints alleging multiple violations of the applicable rules of professional 
conduct, the ISB was investigating the imposition of reciprocal discipline, he was under 
investigation for a complaint made by Jensen to the Idaho State Bar in October 2004, and he had 
twice been disciplined by the Idaho State Bar. CR., p. 198.) 
With respect to Count Two, Appellant testified that he advised Robert that there was a 
conflict of interest in representing him on post-conviction, as there was a potential issue 
regarding his own ineffectiveness as trial counsel. CR., pp. 198-199.) Although Appellant 
asserted that Robert orally waived the conflict of interest, the Committee found that that was not 
the case because Robert raised inelIectiveness of trial counsel in his Affidavit in support of his 
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pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the Committee did not find Appellant was credible 
on that issue. CR., p. 199.) The Committee found that Appellant represented Robert for 16 
months without raising the issue of his own ineffective assistance as trial counsel. CR., p. 199.) 
The Committee found that at the time Appellant was appointed to represent Robert, he at least 
was the subject of one formal charge complaint in Oregon and had twice been disciplined by the 
ISB. CR., p. 199.) 
The Committee also factually found that Appellant has repeatedly demonstrated a 
reluctance to fully accept responsibility for his violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct or willingness to take steps necessary to correct harm caused by his violations. CR., p. 
199.) The Committee found Appellant has repeatedly demonstrated a persistent lack of care 
regarding compliance with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct by committing violations 
even after he had been subject to multiple client complaints and multiple bar investigations in 
two states, after the imposition of discipline in two separate matters, and while he was then being 
investigated for violations of the rules of professional conduct. CR., pp. 199-200.) The 
Committee found Appellant has a history of disciplinary matters which indicate a lack of 
recognition of the reasonable standards of conduct in the area of client communication and fee 
related issues and a pattern of misconduct. CR., p. 200.) The Committee found the number of 
disciplinary actions taken against Appellant and the number of formal charge cases against him 
is unusually high. CR., p. 200.) After reviewing Appellant's disciplinary history set forth above, 
the Committee found that over the period from approximately September 1997 to July 2006, a 
period of less than nine years, Appellant represented fifteen clients who ultimately filed fifteen 
disciplinary grievances against him. Apparently, no grievances were filed against the Appellant 
with any Bar association for his conduct as a lawyer for approximately nineteen months between 
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July 2006 and January 11, 2008, when his license was suspended. However, Appellant's 
wrongful conduct with respect to Loretta and Robert continued into November 2007, less than 
two months before he was suspended pursuant to reciprocal discipline. The Committee found 
that Appellant's wrongful conduct consisted of his continuing failure to repay any portion of the 
retainer paid by Loretta for the representation of Robert, despite several orders, findings and 
recommendations establishing his obligation to do so. In other words, at the same time the ISB 
was assessing Appellant's conduct in Oregon for purposes of reciprocal discipline, the Appellant 
was violating the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to Loretta and Robert 
Illingworth. (R., pp. 204- 205.) 
Finally, the Committee found that despite Appellant's knowledge of multiple prior bar 
complaints against him, he acted in ways which were clearly contrary to the rules in both Counts 
One and Two. (R., p. 205.) 
The Committee also issued conclusions of law based upon the findings of fact set forth 
above. With respect to Count One, the Committee found that in violating I.R.P .C. 1.1S( d) and 
1.16( d), Appellant acted knowingly and intentionally, with the conscious objective or purpose to 
accomplish a particular result, i. e., the conversion of unearned professional fees, which he 
continues to retain, and which caused injury to the clients, as the clients lacked the use of such 
funds from the date Appellant's representation was terminated, July 28, 2006 until the clients 
I were paid from the Client Assistance Fund, March 13,2008. (R., pp. 205-206.) The Committee 
also considered the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and noted that under those 
standards disbarment is the appropriate sanction for violation of those rules when a lawyer 
knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. (R., p. 207, 
I quoting ABA Standard 4.11) and that suspension is the appropriate sanction "when a lawyer 
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knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or 
potential injury to a client." (R., p. 207, quoting ABA Standard 4.12) The Committee concluded 
that before analyzing relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the appropriate sanction 
for the rule violations in Count One was disbarment. (R., p. 207.) 
With respect to its analysis of the Count Two rule violations, the Committee noted that 
under the ABA Standards for lack of diligence, I.R.P.C. 1.3, disbarment is an appropriate 
sanction if a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a 
client. (R., p. 208, quoting ABA Standard 4.41(a)) The Committee noted suspension is an 
appropriate sanction if a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes 
serious or potentially serious injury to a client. (R., pp. 208-209, quoting the ABA Standard 
4.42(a)). The Committee concluded that before analyzing relevant aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, suspension is the appropriate sanction for Appellant's violation of I.R.P .C. 1.3 in 
Count Two. 
With respect to the conflict of interest violation, I.R.P.C. 1.7(a), in Count Two, the 
Committee concluded that before analyzing the relevant aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, disbarment is an appropriate sanction when a lawyer, without the informed 
consent of the client, engages in representation of a client knowing that the lawyer's interests are 
adverse to the client's with the intent to benefit the lawyer and causes serious or potentially 
serious injury to the client. (R., p. 209, quoting ABA Standard 4.31(a)). The Committee 
concluded the appropriate sanction for Appellant's violation of I.R.P.C. 1.7(a) in Count Two is 
disbarment. (R., p. 209.) Finally, with respect to the conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice violation, I.R.P .C. 8.4(d), in Count Two, the Committee noted that before analyzing the 
I relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, disbarment is the appropriate sanction when a 









lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false document, 
or improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to 
a party, or causes a signiilcant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding. 
(R., p. 210, quoting ABA Standard 6.1l.) The Committee concluded the appropriate sanction for 
Appellant's violation ofI.R.P.C. 8.4(d) in Count Two is disbarment. (R., p. 210.) 
The Committee next analyzed aggravating circumstances under ABA Standard 9.2 and 
considered that Appellant had been the subject of prior disciplinary actions in Oregon and Idaho 
and cannot claim ignorance or a lack of familiarity with the rules of professional conduct and the 
disciplinary process. He had been investigated by the bars of both states for violations of those 
rules before the conduct, which is at issue in this case, and he was under investigation for other 
complaints atthe time of his conduct in this case. (R., p. 210.) 
The Committee also concluded that the Appellant's motives with respect to Count One 
were primarily selilsh, but not dishonest. (R., p. 210.) The Committee concluded that Appellant 
has demonstrated a pattern of lack of diligence and failure to return the property of clients when 
required, has committed multiple offenses, has demonstrated bad faith in failing to return 
unearned fees to Loretta and Robert and in failing to repay the Client Assistance Fund. (R., p. 
210.) The Committee also found Appellant demonstrated an inability to fully accept 
responsibility for his actions or in acknowledging clear violations of the rules. (R., p. 21l.) The 
Committee found Appellant's clients in Counts One and Two were particularly vulnerable as 
they faced criminal charges and/or were incarcerated and therefore vested considerable reliance 
in Appellant. (R., p. 21l.) The Committee noted that Appellant had been licensed to practice 
Jaw for at least 15 years and was experienced in the areas of Jaw in those cases. Finally, the 
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Committee noted that Appellant has failed and continues to fail, to make restitution to Loretta or 
the Client Assistance Fund. (R., p. 2] 1.) 
The Committee next analyzed mitigating circumstances under ABA Standard 9.3 and 
determined that Appellant has been relatively cooperative in the investigation of the current 
disciplinary matters, appears to have a good reputation in the community, as demonstrated by 
witnesses with high standing in the community who testified on his behalf, is currently under 
suspension of significant duration, which contains adequate conditions of reinstatement and 
probation and displays some remorse, although the Committee determined his remorse was 
minimal and conditional. (R., p. 211.) 
Based those findings of fact, conclusions of law, the ABA Standards and the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, the Committee recommended that Appellant be disbarred. (R., p. 
212.) 
Appellant then filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Committee's Recommendation. The 
Appellant requested the sanction be changed to a five year suspension to run from January 31, 
2008 through January 31, 2013, to be followed by a four year probation. Appellant also 
suggested the Committee failed to consider all of his mitigating factors. (R., pp. 214-248.) 
The ISB submitted its Memorandum in Response to the Motion to Alter or Amend. The 
ISB argued that Appellant could have resigned in lieu of discipline in the Idaho reciprocal 
disciplinary case in 2005, but chose not to and chose to contest the reciprocal disciplinary case. 
The ISB argued that while Respondent was entitled to make the choice to contest the case, he 
bears the responsibility for that choice. The ISB indicated that if the Committee was inclined to 
retroactively begin any sanction as requested by Respondent, the date of the sanction should be 
either February 1, 2010, when Appellant was eligible to be reinstated from his reciprocal 
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suspension or May 20 I 0, when the formal charge Complaint in this case was filed. Bar Counsel 
also indicated that if the Committee was inclined to reconsider the sanction, Bar Counsel would 
not be adverse to stipulating to a resignation in lieu of discipline. (R., pp. 249-250.) 
On November 9,2011, the Committee issued is Decision on Motion to Alter or Amend. 
The Committee indicated that it devoted a significant amount of time and effort in deciding the 
case and did not come to its decision lightly or without considering all of the facts, including 
those in mitigation of Appellant's conduct. (R., pp. 264-265.) The Committee concluded, after 
consideration of all of the mitigating evidence cited by Appellant, that it fully and fairly 
considered all relevant mitigating factors. The Committee still recommended that Appellant be 
disbarred, but believed the recommended disbarment should be served consecutively not 
concurrently and that a starting date of disbarment of February 1, 2010 would be "commensurate 
with the nature and severity of the violations committed by the Defendant and his disciplinary 
history." (R., p. 267.) 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the Idaho Supreme Court reviews an attorney discipline action, it independently 
examines the record developed before the Professional Conduct Board "to determine whether the 
evidence supports the findings and recommendation of the Board's hearing committee." Idaho 
State Bar v. Warrick, 137 Idaho 86, 90, 44 P.3d 1141, 1145 (2002); Idaho State Bar v. Frazier, 
136 Idaho 22, 25, 28 P.3d 363, 366 (2001); Idaho State Bar v. Souza, 142 Idaho 502, 505, 129 
P.3d 1251, 1254 (2006). The Court will examine the hearing committee's decision to determine 
if it is clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. Idaho State Bar v. Warrick, 137 Idaho 86, 
90, 44 P .3d ] 141, 1145 (2002); Idaho State Bar v. Gatenbein, l3 3 Idaho 316, 319, 986 P.2d 339, 





342 (1999); Idaho State Bar v. Everard, 142 Idaho 109, 112, 124 P.3d 985,988 (2005). The 
hearing committee's findings are entitled to great weight. Id. 
The disciplined attorney has the burden of showing the evidence does not support the 
hearing committee's findings and recommendations. Idaho State Bar v. Malmin, 139 Idaho 304, 
307, 78 P.3d 371, 374 (2003). The Court independently reviews the record and assesses the 
evidence; nevertheless, the Court gives the hearing committee's findings of fact great weight. 
The ultimate responsibility for assessing the facts and ordering the sanctions to be imposed 
however rests with the Idaho Supreme Court. Jd. at 307-308, 78 P.3d at 374-375 and Idaho State 
Bar v. Williams, 126 Idaho 839, 843, 893 P.2d 202, 206 (1995). 
With respect to whether the Committee's recommendation IS clearly erroneous or 
arbitrary and capricious, in Enterprise v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 739, 736 P.2d 729, 734 
(1975), this Court reasoned: 
For the City Council's actions to be deemed "arbitrary or capricious," it must be 
shown that its actions were done without rational basis; were in disregard of the 
facts and circumstances presented; or without adequate determining principles. 
Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when 
exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed 
that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. 
With respect to the clearly erroneous standard, since the findings and recommendation of 
the Committee are analogous to a district court's findings, Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329, 
332, 92 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2004), provides the following guidance: 
This Court affirms a district court's findings of fact unless the findings are 
"clearly erroneous." I.R.C.P. 52(a). Findings "based upon substantial and 
competent, although conflicting, evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Bolger 
v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002) (citing DeChambeau v. 
Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 571, 976 P.2d 922, 925 (1999». This Court 
exercises free review over matters of law. Id. (citing Bouten CanstI'. Co. v. H F. 
Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999». 





Similarly, in Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497,500,767 P.2d 1272, 1275, (Ct. App. 1989), the 
Court of Appeals stated: 
As to the "clearly erroneous" standard under Rule 52(a), clear error will not be 
deemed to exist if the court's findings are supported by substantial and competent, 
though conflicting, evidence. Rasmussen v. Martin, 104 Idaho 401, 659 P.2d ] 55 
(CL App. 1983). Where evidence is conflicting, the task of weighing such 
evidence falls within the province of the trial court. Id. Finally, when a trial 
court's findings of fact are challenged on appeal, the appellant has the burden of 
showing error, and the reviewing court will review the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the respondent. Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 
51 (1979); Salazar v. Tilly, supra. 
III. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellant has raised the following issues on appeal: 
A. Did the Committee erroneously determine that the proper sanction for the violations was 
disbarment? 
B. Should the sanction imposed begin on January 31, 2008 and run concurrently with the 
suspension Appellant is currently serving? 
C. Is the ISB estopped from arguing against its earlier statements that the appropriate 
sanction is a suspension that should begin on January 31, 2008? 
D. Did the Committee ignore, or at least fail to fully acknowledge competent relevant 
material mitigation evidence offered at hearing? 
E. Did this Court violate Appellant's due process rights in rejecting the initial Stipulation? 
F. Were the Committee decisions too late and therefore arbitrary and capricious? 
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IV. 
ARUGMENT 
Appellant has not satisfied his burden of showing that the evidence does not support the 
Committee's recommendation and that the Committee's recommendation is clearly erroneous or 
arbitrary and capricious. The Committee's determination that Appellant should be disbarred 
effective February 1, 2010, has a rational basis and is consistent with the facts and circumstances 
presented to the Committee and consistent with the determining principles, i.e, the Idaho Rules 
of Professional Conduct, the ABA Standards and other disciplinary cases. The Committee's 
findings, conclusions and recommendation are entitled to great weight and are based upon 
substantial and competent evidence. As a consequence, the Court should impose the sanction 
recommended by the Committee. 
A. The Committee's determination that the proper sanction should be 
disbarment was not clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. 
Appellant argues that the Committee's recommended sanction of disbarment was 
erroneous. Appellant argues that the Committee arbitrarily and capriciously ignored relevant 
evidence and failed to correctly apply the ABA Standards. However, the record reveals that the 
evidence supports the Committee's findings, conclusions and recommendation, the Committee's 
recommendation has a rational basis, and is consistent with the facts and circumstances presented 
to the Committee. In addition, the Committee properly applied the ABA Standards. 
II , d Appellant first challenges the Committee's determination that the circumstances relating 
to his representation of Robert Hall in Count Two merit the recommended sanction of 
disbarment. Appellant's challenge fails for several reasons. First, the Committee properly 
evaluated all three of the violations in Count Two, LR.P.C. 1.3, 1.7(a) and 8.4(d) before 





concluding that the recommended sanction for those violations was disbarment. Appellant 
ignores the Committee's evaluation of the violations ofI.R.P.C. 1.3 and 8.4(d), choosing instead 
to focus solely on the conflict of interest violation, I.R.P.C. 1.7(a). 
Initially, the Committee concluded that based upon ABA Standard 4.42, in evaluating the 
violation of I.R.P.C. 1.3, lack of diligence, suspension is an appropriate sanction when the 
lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious· 
injury to a client. The Committee concluded that, before analyzing relevant aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, suspension was the appropriate sanction for Appellant's violation of 
I.R.P.C. 1.3. (R., pp. 207-208.) 
Appellant focuses on the violation of I.R.P.C. 1.7(a), an impermissible conflict of 
interest, which admittedly is the focal point in Count Two. However, the Committee properly 
evaluated the ABA Standards in addressing that violation. The Committee analyzed ABA 
Standard 4.31 ( a) and concluded that before analyzing the relevant aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, disbarment is the appropriate sanction because Appellant, without the informed 
consent of his client, engaged in representation knowing that his interests were adverse to the 
client's with the intent to benefit himself and caused serious or potentially serious injury to the 
client. (R., p. 209.) Based upon that, the Committee properly concluded the appropriate 
sanction for Appellant's violation ofI.R.P.C. 1.7(a) was disbarment. 
With respect to the violation of I.R.P.c. 8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to the administration 
of justice, the Committee concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction under ABA 
Standard 6.11, for the violation of I.R.P.C. 8.4(d) when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the 
court, makes a false statement, submits a false document or properly withholds material, and 
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially 
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significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding. (R., p. 210.) The Committee recognized that 
the impact of Appellant's professional misconduct upon the legal proceedings involving Robert, 
were significant and adverse. 
Appellant'S conscious removal of Robert's post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel had an adverse effect on the administration of justice. Robert's initial post-
conviction relief claims were decided by the district court in February 2006. Robert appealed 
and during the appeal, his new counsel requested a remand based upon Appellant's conflict of 
interest. The State agreed that the case should be remanded and in March 2007, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals remanded the post-conviction case for further proceedings recognizing that 
Appellant's conflict of interest directly resulted in the waiver of Robert's ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel claim. (R., p. 194.) Robert's new post-conviction attorney commenced the 
second round of post-conviction proceedings in October 2007. Following those proceedings and 
following more hearings, the court entered Rule 35 relief in December 2009. As noted, the 
minimum fixed term of 39 years was reduced to 18 years, but that fact that Robert's sentence 
was reduced, potentially as a result of Appellant's misconduct, is not entirely relevant to the 
impact Appellant's misconduct had on Robert's legal proceedings and the administration of 
I justice. Appellant's misconduct resulted in almost four additional years of appeals and post-
conviction proceedings that would have been unnecessary if Appellant did not continue to 
represent Robert in the face of an impennissible conflict of interest. The Committee correctly 
concluded that was a significant adverse effect on the legal proceedings. 
Thus, Appellant's contention the recommendation of disbarment IS arbitrary and 
capricious based solely on his analysis of the I.R.P .C. 1.7 violation fails to consider all of the 
Committee's rationale for its recommendation. In addition, Appellant argues that solely because 















he believes Robert suffered no injury, ABA Standards 4.33 and 4.34 are applicable to the 
analysis of that violation. However the Committee's recommendation is based upon substantial 
and competent evidence, is not arbitrary and capricious, even though Appellant believes an 
erroneous conclusion was reached. 
Appellant claims Robert suffered no damage. The Committee disagreed. In fact, at hearing, 
one of the Committee members indicated that while Robert may have had his sentence reduced 
because of Appellant's professional misconduct, employing a broader perspective of injury to 
consider the protection of the public, it was reasonable to consider that a reduction of a sentence 
for a potentially dangerous criminal defendant was injury or damage to the public and the 
administration of justice. (R., pp. 132-133.) 
Moreover, the Committee's recommendation of disbarment in Count Two was arrived at 
before analyzing the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the ABA 
Standards. A review of the Committee's evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, detailed at pages 20-21 above, demonstrates that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and further supported the Committee's 
recommendation. For example, this is Appellant's third formal charge case in Idaho and he 
resigned in lieu in Oregon facing two formal charge cases. In addition, the Committee "devoted 
a significant amount of time and effort in deciding the case and did not come to a decision lightly 
or without considering all of the facts, including those in mitigation of Appellant's conduct." 
(R., pp. 264-265.) Thus, Appellant simply places more weight on the mitigating circumstances 
and less weight on the aggravating circumstances than the Committee did. As a consequence, 
Appellant believes that an erroneous conclusion has been reached, but even assuming the 
evidence is conflicting, the task of weighing the evidence and applying the ABA Standards to 











that evidence falls within the province of the Committee and the Court. The Committee's 
recommendation of disbarment is the appropriate sanction for the Count Two violations, is not 
clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. 
Appellant also challenges the Committee's recommendation that disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction for the violations ofLR.P.C. 1.16(d) and 1.15(d) in Count One. Appellant's 
challenge fails for similar reasons. Appellant cites the same ABA Standards that the Committee 
considered, 4.11 and 4.12. The Committee concluded that before analyzing relevant aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, the appropriate sanction for the rule violations in Count One was 
disbarment. (R., p. 207.) The Committee concluded that Appellant acted knowingly and 
intentionally, with the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result, i.e., the 
conversion of unearned professional fees, which he continues to retain, and which caused injury 
to the clients, as the clients lacked the use of such funds from the date Appellant's representation 
was terminated, July 28, 2006, until the clients were paid from the Client Assistance Fund, 
March 13, 2008. (R., pp. 205-206.) Under ABA Standard 4.11, the Committee correctly 
concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for a violation of those rules because 
Appellant knowingly converted Loretta's property and caused injury to Robert and Loretta. (R., 
p.207.) 
Appellant argues that Count One was a dispute over fees. That is incredulous and 
contrary to the facts. Loretta paid a $10,000 retainer fee to Appellant in June 2006. Robert sent 
Appellant a letter terminating his representation on July 28, 2006. At the Client Assistant Fund 
hearing, seven months after Appellant was terminated, Appellant submitted a copy of his time 
records reflecting that he performed 13.6 hours of work on Robert's case, in addition to the 
Orofino consultation for which he was paid a $2,000 fixed fee. (R., pp. 189-190.) On June 27, 
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2007, the CAF Committee entered its recommendation that concluded that because Appellant 
failed to return the unearned portion of the $10,000 retainer fee, $7,280, under I.R.P.C. 1.16(d), 
he engaged in dishonest conduct as defined in I.B.C.R. 601(e) and recommended that Loretta be 
reimbursed that amount. Later the Board ordered the CAF Committee to recommend dismissal 
if Appellant reimbursed Loretta the amount determined by the CAF Committee. The CAF 
Committee held a second hearing and concluded if Appellant reimbursed Loretta $7,280 of 
unearned fees within 14 days it would recommend dismissal of the CAF claim. Appellant did 
not return the unearned fees. (R., p. 190.) 
The Client Assistance Fund paid Loretta $7,280, almost two years following Appellant's 
termination of representation. The circumstances reveal the failure to return unearned fees 
constituted a knowing conversion that caused damage to Loretta and Robert, and was more than 
a fee dispute. In addition, under I.R.P.C. 1.15(d), Appellant was obligated to distribute all 
portions of the $10,000 retainer fee not in dispute. Clearly, the fee dispute could not be $7,280, 
given Appellant's own time records. The Committee applied the appropriate ABA Standard to 
such misconduct. 
The Committee's recommendation that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for 
Appellant's Count One professional misconduct is supported by the record and respects the 
determining principles, the ABA Standards and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Consequently, the Committee's recommended sanction for the Count One violations is not 
clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. 
B. The Hearing Committee's recommendation that the effective date of the 
recommended disbarment be February 1,2010 is not clearly erroneous or arbitrary 
and capricious. 
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Appellant argues that his period of suspension should start January 31, 2008 and run 
concurrently with the suspension he is currently serving. In support of his argument, Appellant 
cites the October 6, 2010 StipUlation which was rejected by this Court in the Order to Remand. 
That order remanded the case to the Committee "for the reconsideration of more significant 
sanctions." (R., p. 184.) That Stipulation also provided that, "if the Committee of the 
Professional Conduct Board or the Idaho Supreme Court declines to accept this Stipulation 
and/or Recommendation, each party has the right to withdraw from this stipUlation and proceed 
to hearing on the merits." (R., p. 38.) Appellant made this same argument to the Hearing 
Committee in his Motion to Alter or Amend, which was properly rejected. (R., pp. 214-248.) 
I The Committee's recommendation that the disbarment should be effective February 1, 2010 is 
I sound. 
Appellant's argument is essentially that any suspension for this disciplinary case must run 
I concurrently with his suspension in the reciprocal case. However, that is neither required, nor 
II 'I supported by the record. 
In the Oregon disciplinary proceedings, the first fom1al charge Complaint was filed on 
December 2002 and the second Complaint was filed in June 2004. In August 2004, Appellant 
resigned from the Oregon State Bar in lieu of discipline. The Idaho reciprocal disciplinary 
proceeding was filed in June 2005. The first thing Appellant did in that case was file a motion to 
dismiss the reciprocal disciplinary case. That motion was denied and the matter proceeded to 
III III • hearing. The hearing was required because Appellant denied all the rule violations related to his resignation in lieu of discipline in Oregon, since under the Oregon rules the resignation did not 
include an admission of any violations of the Oregon rules of professional conduct. In March 
2007, the Committee issued its Recommendation and found that Appellant had committed 













multiple violations of LR.P.C. l.2, l.3, lA, l.l6( d) and SA( c) and one violation of each I.R.P .C. 
1.5(f) and SA(d). Those violations related to Appellant's representation of seven clients III 
Oregon in a variety of post-conviction relief proceedings. (Exhibit 9, pp. 13-77.) 
This Court issued its Disciplinary Order in the reciprocal case on January 17, 200S. That 
order suspended Appellant for five years, with three years of that suspension withheld. 
Appellant was not eligible to reinstated until February 1, 2010. 
The facts and circumstances underlying this case did not conclude until March 200S 
(Count One) and December 2009 (Count Two). The Client Assistance Fund payment to Loretta 
was made in March 200S, and in Robert's case, the court order concluding the Rule 35 
proceedings, necessitated by Appellant's conflict of interest, was entered in December 2009. In 
May 2010, before Appellant sought reinstatement, this disciplinary case was filed. (R., pp. 251-
252.) 
A consideration of the timing of the reciprocal and this disciplinary case reflects the 
propriety of the Committee's recommended disbarment date, February 1,2010. The Committee 
rejected Appellant's request that the disbarment be retroactive to January 31, 200S, for a number 
of reasons. First, Appellant could have resigned in lieu of discipline in the Idaho reciprocal 
disciplinary case in 2005. However, Appellant chose not to and chose to contest every aspect of 
the reciprocal disciplinary case through hearing. That was Appellant's choice and the eventual 
sanction entered was less time than a resignation in lieu of discipline would have been. 
Appellant was entitled to choose to contest that case, but Appellant should bear the responsibility 
for that choice. 
Second, there was no material delay between the conclusion of the Oregon disciplinary 
proceedings and the commencement of the Idaho reciprocal disciplinary proceedings. Third, 
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Appellant practiced law in Idaho from the start of the reciprocal proceeding in June 200S until 
January 31, 2008. Fourth, when Appellant was eligible for reinstatement, Appellant did not 
submit a request for reinstatement, despite the fact that I.B.C.R. S18(b)(1) provides that a 
petition for reinstatement by a suspended lawyer may be filed no sooner than 90 days before the 
end of his suspension. Fifth, there was no material delay in this disciplinary case since the 
circumstances relating to the consequences of Appellant's misconduct alleged in Count Two 
were not known before December 2009, even though Appellant's conduct occurred well before 
that date. Finally, Bar Counsel agreed to stipulate to a resignation in lieu of discipline if the 
Committee recommended or otherwise approved that Bar Counsel do so. However, the 
Committee decided that disbarment was appropriate based upon the record. Consequently, 
Appellant has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that the Committee's recommended 
effective disbarment date of February 1,2010 is clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. 
c. The Idaho State Bar is not estopped from recommending that the 
appropriate sanction should be a suspension that should begin January 31, 2008. 
Appellant argues that the Idaho State Bar cannot change its position from the October 6, 
2010 Stipulation, that was rejected by this Court. That stipUlation provided that if the Court 
rejected the Committee's recommendation, each party has the right to withdraw from the 
Stipulation and proceed to hearing on the merits. That provision was consistent with I.B.C.R. 
S14(a)(l). (R., p. 38.) The Court's Order to Remand remanded the case to the Committee for 
the reconsideration of more significant sanctions. The Court's remand to the Committee was 
consistent with I.B.C.R. S14(b)(2) and I.B.C.R. S11(k)(2). The effective date of any sanction 
clearly falls within the scope of a more significant sanction. Finally, even Appellant 
acknowledges the principle of judicial estoppel is not applicable to these circumstances and that 
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his real argument is that ISB cannot alter its position. (Brief, p. 33.) For these reasons and the 
reasons set forth in the preceding section, the ISB is not bound by the prior stipUlation or 
estopped from arguing that the sanction should start from a different date. 
D. The Committee did not ignore or fail to fully acknowledge competent 
relevant material mitigation evidence offered at hearing. 
Appellant argues that the Committee ignored, or at least failed to fully acknowledge 
competent, relevant, material mitigation evidence offered during the April 4, 2012 hearing. 
However, Appellant's argument is contrary to the record and the Committee's decisions. In its 
initial decision, the Committee analyzed the aggravating circumstances under ABA Standard 9.2 
The Committee then analyzed the mitigating factors under ABA Standard 9.3. The Committee 
considered that Appellant had been relatively cooperative in the investigation of the current 
disciplinary matter, appeared to have a good reputation in the community, as demonstrated by 
witnesses with high standing in the community who testified on his behalf, is currently under 
suspension of significant duration and which contains adequate conditions of reinstatement and 
probation and that he displays some remorse, although the Committee determined his remorse 
was minimal and conditional. (R., p. 211.) 
Following its consideration of the ABA Standards and those aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, the Committee recommended Appellant be disbarred. (R., p. 212.) Appellant 
then filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Committee's Decision. In that motion, Appellant 
argued that the Committee failed to find all the mitigating circumstances established by the 
record in the case, reiterated what Appellant considered were mitigating circumstances and 
devoted eight pages to discussing those mitigating circumstances. (R., pp. 217-224.) Similarly, 
Appellant's Brief, devotes eighteen pages to a recitation of the mitigation evidence he presented 
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at hearing. (Brief pp. 7-24) Finally, Appellant attached fourteen mitigation evidence exhibits to 
his Brief. 
In its decision on the Motion to Alter or Amend, the Committee initially noted that it 
devoted a significant amount of time and effort in deciding the case, was very aware of the 
import of its decision and its affect on Appellant. (R. p., 264.) The Committee said it "did not 
come to its decision lightly and certainly did not come to its decision without a full consideration 
of all of the facts, including those in mitigation of Appellant's conduct." (R., p. 265.) The 
Committee continued by referencing Appellant's contention that the Committee "failed to find 
all of the mitigating circumstances established by the record in this case," and then delineated the 
fourteen mitigating facts Appellant believed the Committee failed to consider. (R., pp. 265-266.) 
Based upon all of that, the Committee concluded that it fully and fairly considered all relevant 
mitigating factors. (R., p. 266.) 
Moreover, in response to Appellant's argument, that the Committee was unfair when the 
Committee described Appellant as being only relatively cooperative and showing only minimal 
and conditional remorse, the Committee said that statement only emphasized the Appellant's 
refusal to accept full responsibility for his actions. Based upon those conclusions, the Committee 
affirmed its conclusion that disbarment was appropriate. (R., pp. 266-267.) 
Thus, Appellant's contention that the Committee failed to acknowledge mitigation 
evidence and ignored mitigation evidence is contrary to both of the Committee's decisions. The 
Committee's decisions did not disregard mitigating circumstances and those decisions were not 
clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious in this regard. 
Apparently, as part of his contention that the Committee failed to consider mitigation and 
that a five year suspension is the appropriate sanction, Appellant discusses other disciplinary 
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cases at pages 38-42 of his Brief. While those cases address general principles relating to 
disciplinary cases and sanctions, their utility is limited by the different facts and disciplinary 
history in this case. Disciplinary cases are fact driven and the conduct and sanctions in the cases 
addressed are not as instructive to the appropriate sanction as the Committee's detailed factual 
findings and conclusions based upon the ABA Standards. 
However, one case that is potentially related to this case is Idaho State Bar v. Tway, 128 
Idaho 794, 919 P.2d 794 (1996). As Appellant points out, in Tway, the Court entered a five year 
suspension and rejected the Hearing Committee's disbarment recommendation. However, the 
circumstances in Tway are factually distinguished in one important respect. The Court 
recognized Tway's misconduct occurred around the same time as the conduct he had previously 
been suspended for and was part of an ongoing pattern of misconduct that the Court had already 
addressed. Id. at 799,919 P.2d at 328. Unlike, Tway, Appellant's material misconduct in this 
case occurred in 2006-2008 (Count One) and in 2004-2005 (Count Two) and was not specifically 
within the pattern of misconduct relating to his prior public reprimand in 2001, or the Oregon 
representation that occurred years before that case started in December 2002 and then was 
I amended to reflect conduct that occurred after that date and before June 2004, or the reciprocal 
I I
, 
suspension based thereon imposed January 31, 2008. Appellant's numerous instances of 
misconduct and the Committee's findings and conclusions differ materially from Tway and the 
other cases cited by Appellant. The reliance on those cases does not establish that the 
Committee's recommendation is clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. 
E. The Idaho Supreme Court did not violate Appellant's due process rights by 
rejecting the Committee's Recommendation based upon the October 2010 
Stipulation. 
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Appellant argues that this Court violated his rights to due process by rejecting the 
Committee's October 27, 2010 Recommendation, which was based upon the October 6,2010 
StipUlation. The primary defect with Appellant's argument is that if fails to acknowledge that 
the ultimate responsibility for assessing the facts and ordering disciplinary sanctions to be 
imposed rests with the Idaho Supreme Court. Idaho State Bar v. Maim in, 139 Idaho 304, 307-
308, 78 P.3d 371, 374-375 (2003) and Idaho State Bar v. Williams, 126 Idaho 839, 843, 893 P.2d 
202,206 (1995). The Idaho Supreme Court independently examines the record developed before 
the Professional Conduct Board to determine whether the evidence supports the findings, 
conclusions and recommendation of the Committee. Idaho State Bar v. Warrick, 137 Idaho 86, 
90,44 P.3d 1141, 1145 (2002); Idaho State Bar v. Frazier, 136 Idaho 22, 25, 28 P.3d 363, 366 
(2002); and Idaho State Bar v. Souza, 142 Idaho 502, 505, 129 P.3d 1251, 1254 (2006). In 
addition, the Idaho Supreme Court's consideration and rejection of the October 2010 
Recommendation based on the stipUlation was consistent with its rules, I.B.C.R. 514(b )(2) and 
I.B.C.R.511(k)(2). 
Appellant's argument that due process was violated solely by a rejection of the 
Recommendation based upon a stipulation fails. Following the Order to Remand, Appellant was 
afforded a hearing before the Committee. The Committee issued its decision, which included 
detailed findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation. (R., pp. 185-213.) 
Following that decision, Appellant, filed his motion to alter or amend the Committee's 
recommendation, consistent with the process permitted by I.B.C.R. 511 (h)(2). That motion was 
fully briefed and then the Committee entered its second decision which altered its 
recommendation from disbarment from the date of any disciplinary order to disbarment effective 
February 1,2010. (R., pp. 264-268.) 






Appellant was given notice of the facts and issues regarding his professional misconduct 
in the Complaint. He answered that complaint and denied the misconduct. Appellant had a 
hearing and an opportunity to present why the Committee's initial decision following that 
hearing should be altered. Finally, Appellant appealed the recommendation, his appeal has been 
briefed, will be argued and decided by this Court. Consequently, Appellant has been afforded 
due process throughout these proceedings. See, Idaho State Bar v. Everard, 142 Idaho, 109, 124 
P.3d 985 (Idaho 2005). Appellant has not stated any basis for relief based upon a deprivation of 
due process. 
F. The Committee did not violate Appellant's due process rights by issuing 
decisions that were too late and therefore arbitrary and capricious. 
Appellant argues that the Committee violated his due process rights by entering its first 
decision more than 28 days following the conclusion of the hearing and by issuing its decision on 
the motion to alter and amend more than 14 days following receipt of the motion under LB.C.R. 
511 (h). LB.C.R. 511 (h)(1) provides that the Committee shall send its findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and recommendation to the Clerk within 28 days following the conclusion of 
the hearing and I.B.C.R. 511 (h)(2) provides that the Committee shall, within 14 days of receipt 
of a motion to alter or amend, alter or amend its decision, deny the motion or schedule it for 
hearing. As an aside, the transcript of the April 4, 2011 hearing was not received from the court 
reporter until April 21, 2011. 
However, I.B.C.R. 525(i) specifically states that, unless otherwise provided, "the time in 
which any act or anything is to be done or performed is not jurisdictional." Therefore, contrary 
to Appellant's argument, the timing of the entry of the Committee's decision following hearing 






and its decision following the motion to alter or amend were not jurisdictional and the 
Committee did not violate due process by issuing its decisions when it did. 
In addition, Appellant does not argue or provide any proof that the Committee's issuance 
of its decisions prejudiced his interests. He has not been licensed to practice law in Idaho since 
January 31, 2008 and even if the Court were enter the five year suspension as requested by 
Appellant in his motion to alter or amend, he would not be eligible for reinstatement until 
February 1, 2013. Therefore, the timing of the Committee's decisions did not affect Appellant's 
ability to practice law. He has provided no proof of prejudice in other respects. Consequently, 
the timing of the Committee's decisions are not jurisdictional, are not a deprivation of due 
process, or clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
The Committee's recommendation is based upon clear, convmcmg, substantial and 
competent evidence. The Committee's findings are entitled to great weight. Appellant is unable 
to satisfy the burden of showing that the evidence does not support the Committee's findings, 
conclusions and recommendation and that the recommendation is clearly erroneous or arbitrary 
and capricious. The Committee's recommended sanction is appropriate and the Court should 
issue a discipline order consistent therewith. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 
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